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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
A well-functioning public expenditure management (PEM) system is considered to be a 
critical pillar of government efficiency by most practitioners, who place it on par with a low- 
distortion tax system and an efficient tax administration. It is therefore unfortunate that there 
is so little economic research on the design of PEM systems, especially on the theoretical 
side.2 On the empirical side, papers have generally focused on the efficiency of public 
expenditure in key sectors (health and education), and only a few attempts have been made to 
quantify the welfare losses associated with a weak PEM system. They all point to rather high 
economic costs. For example, a public spending tracking survey in Uganda concludes that 
only 13 percent of nonsalary expenditures earmarked for primary schools reached the 
intended beneficiaries during 1991–95. The bulk of the allocated spending was either used by 
public officials for purposes unrelated to education or captured for private gain (Ablo and 
Reinikka, 1998; Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). In Ghana, a survey concluded that 20 percent 
of nonwage public health expenditure and 50 percent of nonwage education expenditure 
reached the frontline facilities (Ye and Canagarajah, 2002). In Cameroon, one observes a 
“loss” of about 25 percent of the value of received goods and services with respect to the 
value of committed funds (République du Cameroun, 2004).  
 
The importance of a good PEM system has come to the forefront of the debate in the context 
of the debt initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), which provides substantial 
debt relief from the international community while requiring eligible countries to pursue good 
economic policies and to make their budget more “pro-poor,” using the HIPC relief for 
spending on priority areas of a country’s poverty reduction strategy (PRS). The difficulty in 
tracking public expenditure has become clear during the systematic assessment of the capacity 
of some 25 HIPCs by international financial institutions.3 Without getting into the details of 
the methodology used to assess PEM systems, it is worth mentioning that it was based on 15 
(extended to 16 in 2004) benchmarks relating to the three main components of budget 
management.4 The studies indicate that, while progress has been made since the initiative was 
launched, a majority of HIPCs still require substantial upgrading of their PEM systems to be 
capable of reliably tracking public spending. In particular, internal control and the production 
of final audited accounts are the areas in most need of strengthening. 
 
                                                 
2 However, there is a growing literature on performance, program, and output budgeting, which basically aims to 
improve the information available on the effectiveness of public expenditure, and hence helps improve 
performance through enhanced accountability. 
3 This assessment was initiated in 2002 and recently updated (see IDA/IMF, 2002, 2005). 
4 More recently, several bilateral donors and multilateral institutions have set up the Public Expenditure and 
Financial Accountability (PEFA) Program. It aims to build a strategic and collaborative approach to assessing 
and reforming partner countries’ public expenditure, procurement, and financial accountability systems, and 
identifies a set of performance indicators and benchmarks, in order to help address developmental and fiduciary 
objectives. It has developed a Public Financial Management (PFM) performance measurement system, and 
assesses PFM systems against six critical objectives: budget realism; comprehensive, policy-based budget; fiscal 
management; information; control; accountability and transparency.  The sixteen criteria are presented in 
Appendix I. 
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The problem is that the list of recommended key reforms for “getting the basics right” 
(Schick, 1997) is quite large and, although internal and external controls are identified as 
priorities, the list of priorities also covers most other areas (see Diamond, 2006). As HIPCs 
are, by definition, severely constrained in terms of both financial and human resources, it 





Source: IDA/IMF (2002). 
 
 
In this paper, we use the well researched principal-agent theoretical framework to clarify the 
issues arising in PEM systems and help prioritize the PEM reform agenda. It has already been 
argued that a chain of principal-agent relationships characterizes PEM systems, which in turn 
raises the potential for agency problems. In the words of Tanzi (2000, p. 445), “Between their 
creation and their final implementation, fiscal decisions go through many stages at which 
mistakes, indifference, passive resistance, implicit opposition, and various forms of principal-
agent problems may distort the final outcome.” The author cites as examples problems 
occurring in formulating policies (because the behavior prescribed by the ideal role of the 
state may not be in the interest of the individuals who constitute the government), and 
problems arising between the government (as principal) and top bureaucrats (as agents), as 
well as between top bureaucrats (as principals) and employees (as agents).  
 
We interpret corruption and bad governance as stemming from asymmetric information and 
interest divergence between those who perform tasks (the agents) and those on whose behalf 
tasks are performed (the principals). A rent can thus be captured by the agents at the expense 
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of their principal.5 The reason is that a low level of output can be due either to a low 
exogenous “state of nature,” or to some misbehavior (such as a low effort level or corruption) 
by the agent. In our model, the ministry of finance (MoF) acts as the principal, providing 
public funds to line ministries (the LMs which are, for example, the ministry of education, the 
health ministry, or some other public body) to implement a set of actions. The relationship 
between the MoF and the LMs is an agency problem subject to asymmetric information both 
on some external parameters and on the actions performed. In case of low output, the MoF is 
not in a position to distinguish the cause, unless it uses some form of audit. The principal’s 
problem is to design the contract that most efficiently forces the agent to meet the 
requirements. The contract must therefore specify a level of output (depending on the state of 
nature) associated with a certain level of transfer, as well as some control and sanction 
parameters. 
 
The MoF has a number of instruments at its disposal to limit rent-seeking behaviors. These 
include, in particular, internal controls within the LM. In the so-called Francophone system of 
PEM (prevailing in most of French-speaking Africa), the MoF usually places some of its 
employees in the LMs, and their duty is to check that the operations performed by the LMs 
comply with the contract. In the Anglophone system (prevailing in most Anglophone African 
countries), the approach is different: the LM, being accountable for its performance ex post 
(and this is verified by the court of audit), tries to prevent non-compliance by having some of 
its own employees check the operations of others. In a sense, the head of the LM becomes the 
principal and its employees are the agents. In most cases (Anglophone, Francophone, or other 
systems), outcomes are verified ex post by a court of audit, in charge of analyzing the 
performance of the LM and reporting its findings to the relevant authorities (usually 
parliament).6 If corruption is detected, the official concerned will be punished by disciplinary 
action or through the judicial system, sometimes entailing a hefty penalty (such as the “mise 
en débêt” in France).7 These examples suggest that the literature on incentives and contract 
design provides the background for a potentially very useful model to analyze PEM issues 
and guide reforms.8 However, most traditional models do not exactly fit the realities of PEM 
systems, and adjustments are needed to take into account their specific features and 
constraints. These will be identified and elaborated upon as the model is developed.9 
 
The paper is structured as follows. We interpret a PEM system in light of the assumptions 
commonly found in the principal-agent literature in Section II. We then present the basic 
                                                 
5 This interpretation is consistent with that of political and social sciences, which refer to the broader notion of 
“rent capture” rather than corruption. 
6 In some countries, such as Belgium and Lebanon, the court of audit may also perform some ex ante control. In 
this paper, we restrict our attention to the functions of ex ante versus ex post controls, irrespective of the 
institution performing them. 
7 The “mise en débêt” is a tool to make public accountants personally responsible for financial wrongdoings 
discovered in their management of public funds by the court of audit or similar body. 
8 Note that assuming a strict agency relationship between the MoF and the LM is a simplification of realities. A 
powerful LM could often play a very important role in budget negotiations, simply because it has more 
knowledge about requirements in its own area than the MoF. This could be particularly true at the time of budget 
preparation, where the LM could consider itself as an equal partner to the MoF. 
9 Potter and Diamond (1999) and Bouley, Fournel, and Leruth (2002) discuss several of these constraints. 
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features of the model in Section III. Section IV discusses ex post audits and their value in 




II.   INTERPRETATION OF PEM UNDER THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
 
A.   The Contract 
We base our analysis on standard principal-agent models involving supervision (Kofman and 
Lawarrée, 1993, 1996; Khalil and Lawarrée, 2003). We essentially focus on the control of 
LMs or assimilated bodies by the MoF, which is supposed to represent the public interest. 
LMs can be seen as agents of the MoF (the principal) because they are required to produce a 
certain level of public output—including the quality of this output—in exchange for their 
budget appropriation. The pair “expenditure program – budget appropriation” can be 
interpreted as the two components of the contract between the MoF and the LMs.10 The 
objective of the MoF is to induce the LMs into implementing their expenditure programs, 
while the LMs pursue their own objectives. That relationship entails both hidden actions (e.g., 
the productive “effort” of the civil servants, possible perquisite consumption, or corruption) 
and hidden information (e.g., the exogenous productivity of that particular sector of the 
economy), with the agents having the informational advantage over the principal. Hidden 
information could also refer to poor program design, which would lead to inefficiency and 
would be difficult to dissociate from the inefficiency originating from a weak PEM system.11 
 
As already indicated, a number of government operations can be assimilated to principal-
agent relationships. For example, one could consider that the minister (who is the head of the 
ministry, but also a political appointee) heading the LM is a principal whose objective is to 
make sure that his agents (the civil servants) implement what he has promised to do. One 
could also consider that the parliament is the principal, whose objective is to make sure that 
the government (the executive) implements the government’s program. Yet another example 
would be to model the central government as the principal, while the subnational governments 
are the agents. A paper by Ahmad, Tandberg and Zhang (2002) looks at this issue, using a 
principal-agent framework to analyze incentive structures that best compel local governments 
to truthfully reveal their ability to implement national programs. The paper focuses on the 
optimal contract between both levels of governments. It also insists on the need to have a 
multiperiod game in order to make punishments credible. 
 
An important element of any principal-agent model is to specify an observable that will be the 
main element of the contract. When the agent is the LM, measuring performance should 
ideally be based on a mix of indicators including output, outcome, and impact. Such 
information is usually difficult to obtain, and although simply measuring inputs is clearly not 
                                                 
10 This is in line with the approach adopted for instance in the Australian budgeting system, where so-called 
Service and Resource Allocation Agreements are prepared and implemented (NSW Treasury, 2000). 
11 For example, if the health system in a country does not perform well, say in terms of vaccination ratios, it can 
be because the health ministry focuses on other things (and could do those efficiently). It could also be because 
the money appropriated for the purchase of vaccines gets “lost” in the system. A weak PEM system would 
generally refer to the latter. See for example Gupta and Verhoeven (2000). 
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satisfactory, it is often the only variable for which adequate data are available. Furthermore, 
the level of resources in many developing countries, including the HIPCs, is such that 
broadening the statistics coverage can lead to the undesirable consequence of a serious 
degradation in the quality of data (i.e., information on inputs). Beyond the availability of data, 
the complexity of performing meaningful measurements, and potential biases linked to the use 
of performance indicators, it may also not be fully realistic to assume that the MoF has the 
capability to judge outcomes. Hence, we will hereafter use the term “output” in a general 
sense, i.e., to mean one variable that the MoF is in a position to measure, and this could 
include outcomes. 
 
It also follows that we formally model a program budgeting process, although the results also 
apply to countries that do not explicitly use that approach.12  In our model, LMs must make 
proposals on their priorities, on objectives to be reached, and on corresponding (quantifiable) 
targets.13 The LM budget proposal is then negotiated with the MoF. However, we do not 
model the negotiation process. The contract comprises both: 
 
• the required “output” to be produced by the LM (in terms of provision of public goods 
and services), and thus, implicitly, the “effort” required from the LM; and 
 
• the LM “transfer,” i.e., its budget appropriation. 
 
A menu of possibilities can be included in the contract to take into account the general 
economic conditions or make relevant assumptions. For instance, it could be specified that, 
under a baseline scenario with realistic growth prospects, the LMs are required to operate with 
their existing capacities; but, under a more optimistic assumption (the country receives more 
debt relief, or the economy experiences higher growth), the LMs could make additional 
investments. In fact, this is increasingly happening in the context of PRS Papers (PRSPs), 
which often present a baseline scenario, plus a higher aid scenario based on the resource 
availability necessary to reach the MDGs.14 We assume that, everything else being equal, the 
LM prefers being granted a large budget appropriation but dislikes the effort associated with 
the performance requirements. 
 
                                                 
12 To quote a very practical definition from the New South Wales Treasury: “Output budgeting involves the 
Executive Government explicitly ‘purchasing’ outputs from program and service delivery agencies (the 
‘providers’) in order to achieve desired Government outcomes [...]. With performance budgeting, the Executive 
Government funds (or ‘purchases’) an agency’s program and delivery plan (a set of program and delivery 
strategies) which the agency has developed in order to achieved desired Government outcomes” (NSW Treasury, 
2000, p. 13). 
13 Ideally, these objectives are defined in the context of a medium-term (three-year) framework and based on a 
comprehensive macroeconomic model. A multiyear budget framework has the potential to improve incentives, 
for instance by allowing the introduction of intertemporal competition across agents (Ahmad and Martinez, 
2004). Although we will not address this issue in the context of the paper, it is important to note that the lack of a  
proper framework for medium-term budgeting has also been identified by the IMF and the World Bank as an 
area that requires substantial strengthening. 
14 The PRSP approach was launched in 1999 in the context of the HIPC initiative. A PRSP describes a country’s 
macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as 
associated external financing needs. Its preparation and implementation now often condition the release of aid 
funds and debt relief. 
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B.   Agency Problems 
The agency problem arises from the diverging interests of the MoF and the LM, and the 
latter’s informational advantage, both on its own actions and on the current state of nature. As 
standard in the principal-agent literature, the agent’s effort is a necessary component of the 
production function—but entails some disutility. The agent may take unfair advantage of its 
superior information: if external conditions are favorable, the LM could exert little effort and 
produce a low output, while claiming that this low output is due to unfavorable external 
conditions. The MoF is not in a position to disentangle the two factors unless it uses some 
form of audit or supervision. There is thus a risk that the LM captures some rent at the 
expense of the MoF.15 In the principal-agent literature, this cheating rent generally stems from 
lowering the level of effort vis-à-vis the compensation received. Rents, and possible 
reductions in public output, compared to what is economically efficient, constitute the agency 
costs. 
 
In this paper, we broaden the interpretation of corruption (generally referred to as the abuse of 
public office for private benefits) to include misgovernance stemming from the abuse of some 
information asymmetry. We consider the LM’s effort in terms of a combination of factors that 
can be good and bad, including, on the one (good) hand, an efficient and equitable allocation 
of resources, fiscal transparency measures, and quality of services provided; and, on the other 
(bad) hand, corruption, consumption of perquisites, mismanagement, and nepotism in the 
choice of staff or suppliers. This allows us to interpret the cheating rent, not only in terms of 
reduced disutility from “productive” effort, but also as corruption or misgovernance. For 
example, if the state of nature is high (say, favorable weather conditions), the LM could 
allocate some resources to unproductive areas or divert monies, if it thinks that the MOF 
could be led to believe that the state of nature was low. In such cases, rent capture takes place 
and is possible because of the information asymmetry between the principal and its agent. 
This interpretation enables us to link our approach with the empirical literature on corruption. 
Indeed, the latter identifies various factors contributing to corruption, including the overall 
level of potential benefits from corrupt behaviour, the cost of bribery (including penalties and 
sanctions), and the bargaining power and extent of discretionary powers of the various actors 
(Chand and Moene, 1999).  Moreover, while cheating (exerting a lower effort) is probably 
costless for the agent, we argue in this paper that cheating, in the sense of being corrupt, may 
entail some costs to be concealed. This enables us to make the link with the literature on 
collusion in organizations (e.g., Tirole, 1986), and in Section V, we interpret ex ante controls 
by the MoF as increasing the cost of cheating for the agent. 
 
As already stated, the MoF has a number of instruments and strategies at its disposal to limit 
agency problems. First, it can use incentive schemes, designed solely on observable 
information, and promise to grant the LM a transfer equivalent to the sum of a suitable 
compensation for the LM’s effort and an informational rent (which depends on incentive 
compatibility constraints) in case of high productivity.16 If such a contract exists, it prevents 
the LM from exerting little effort—but at the expense (for the MoF) of a loss equivalent to the 
                                                 
15 Hereafter we use the term “informational rent” when referring to the supplementary premium that the LM is 
deliberately granted as an incentive to exert high effort. We use the term “cheating rent” to refer to the amount 
illegally diverted, notably through corruption. 
16 In this paper, we use indifferently performance payment (contingent on observable/verifiable results) and 
informational rent, although the latter is, in principle, more general (the difference between the expected utility 
of an agent with private information and his reservation utility). 
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informational rent, in addition to a distortion created by requiring a lower level of effort in 
some occurrences of the productivity factor. Although commonly applied to models of the 
corporate world (e.g., granting board members bonuses or shares), this strategy is not always 
directly applicable in the public sector.17 Alternatively, the MoF can supervise the LM using a 
number of instruments and can threaten it with appropriate sanctions if cheating is detected. 
The design of the appropriate control system must take a number of factors into account, for 
instance the choice between ex ante and ex post (or internal and external) controls, the type of 
variables to be monitored (input versus result indicators), and the choice between systematic 
or random audits. In our model, there are two unobservable variables (effort and state of 
nature). Supervision could thus turn either to the exogenous productivity factor, from the 
observation of which the agent’s behavior could be inferred (this relates for instance to public 
sector reforms aimed at improving the economic statistical data collection, or to audits 
targeted at assessing the program design), or directly to the agent’s effort. In this paper, we 
assume that the MoF will audit the LM’s effort.18 
 
C.   Timing 
The MoF and the LMs act in a continued relationship framework, because a new budget is 
prepared every year. However, we consider that the external productivity occurrences are 
independent, so that the MoF cannot infer the state of nature—and thus the LM’s effort—
from what happened in previous years. This allows us to simplify the problem and limit 
ourselves to the study of the optimal static contract. Nevertheless, the actual repetition of the 
game allows the MoF to make credible commitments. 
 
We assume that the timing of the PEM process is as follows: 
 
(1) After negotiations (not modeled here—but note that the contract guarantees the LM its 
reservation utility), the LM accepts the contract proposed by the MoF; the contract is a 
menu of {output and implicit effort19/budgetary allocation} pairs, dependent on the 
external productivity occurrence. 
(2) Nature chooses the level of the external productivity parameter, and only the LM 
observes it. 
(3) The LM chooses its level of effort and starts producing the output; in the meantime, 
the MoF can exert ex ante controls. 
(4) The transfer is paid through warrants (if the LM plans to reach a high level of output, 
it can justify it and call for additional credits). 
(5) The MoF collects the output, which is publicly observable at the end of the budgetary 
year. 
                                                 
17 Incentive schemes may be used in public companies (see, for instance, the regulation theory following Laffont 
and Tirole, 1993) and also, to some extent, in customs administrations (on the theoretical side, see, for instance, 
Besley and McLaren, 1993).  
18 A model close to ours, which combines adverse selection and moral hazard, predicts that monitoring the 
agent’s action is strictly preferable to auditing private information (Kessler, 2000). 
19 As we shall see, the effort level required from the LM should be optimal with respect to the contracted output. 
It is thus implicitly defined. This problem is a case of “false moral hazard” where the observation of the variable 
does not allow to perfectly disentangle the agent’s “type” and effort level (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). 
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(6) The MoF can order an audit if it suspects that cheating took place (or simply because 
it has committed to make these audits for long-term credibility purposes). 
(7) The LM (or its program manager) is imposed a penalty if caught cheating. 
 
 
III.   THE BASIC MODEL 
A.   Main Assumptions 
The model developed here is close to the literature on supervision as in Kofman and Lawarrée 
(1993) and Khalil and Lawarrée (2003). However, it differs in some assumptions so as to 
better reflect the features of PEM systems. The added value of this paper lies in the practical 
applications to PEM of the analysis, but also in those differences. 
 
We model the agency relationship between the MoF and one LM, both assumed risk-neutral.20 
The LM produces a level of output x , which depends on two variables: a random exogenous 
productivity factor, θ ; and the LM actions or effort, e , such that ( ),x eα θ= ; with 0eα > ; 
0eeα < ; 0θα > . The realized output is public knowledge, but e  and θ  are the LM’s private 
information. The external productivity can be either high or low: iθ  with { },i H L∈  and 
0H Lθ θ θ∆ = − > . We also assume ( ) ( ), ,H Le eα θ α θ> ; and ( ) ( ), , 0e H e Le eα θ α θ> > . It is 
common knowledge that the MoF assigns ex ante probability q  to the event that i H=  (and 
probability ( )1 q−  to the event that i L= ). When state i  occurs, the LM exerts a certain 
effort level ie , thus producing an output ( ),i i ix eα θ= .  
 
The monetary equivalent of the LM’s disutility from effort is represented by an increasing and 
strictly convex function ( )eψ , with 0eψ > and 0eeψ > . To obtain strictly positive but 
bounded optimal efforts, we also assume that ( ),0 0α θ = ; ( )0 0ψ = ; ( )
0
lim 0ee eψ→ = ; 
( )
0
lim ,ee eα θ→ = ∞ ; ( )lim ee eψ→∞ = ∞ ; and ( )lim , 0ee eα θ→∞ = . The LM’s utility is given by 
( )u t eψ= − , where t  is the transfer (appropriation) it receives, and its reservation utility is 
normalized at zero. We also assume that θ∆  is large enough so that the MoF is always better 
off in case of high output: H H L Lx t x t− > − . 
 
B.   Perfect Information Benchmark 
The MoF’s problem is to choose the levels of effort required from, and transfers to be made 
to, the LM for each occurrence of the random factor, so as to maximize the expected output: 
 
                                                 
20 In practice, the MoF would try to maximize the joint output of several LMs. By restricting the model to one 
LM, we assume the MoF treats all LMs equally. The case of several LMs is indirectly handled when the 
probability of audit is below one (notably in the mixed strategy equilibrium), which may be interpreted as 
follows: the MoF can possibly audit only a certain number of LMs, and each LM chooses its cheating level 
considering that probability of being audited. 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, , ,
, 1 ,
H L H L
H H H L L Le e t t
Max E X q e t q e tα θ α θ= − + − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (P) 
 
Subject to the LM’s individual rationality (IR) or participation constraints under each 
occurrence: 
 
 ( ) 0H Ht eψ− ≥  IR(H) 
 ( ) 0L Lt eψ− ≥  IR(L) 
 
Under perfect information, the MoF equates the LM’s marginal cost of effort with the 
marginal value of its product: ( ) ( )* *,e i i e ie eα θ ψ= , with { },i H L∈ .21 The transfers are such 
that both participation constraints are binding: ( )* *i it eψ= . The MoF can therefore enforce 
first-best, efficient efforts, and the LM gets no rent. Note too that, according to our 
assumptions, * *H Le e> .22 
 
C.   Second-Best Solutions 
Under imperfect information, effort is not observable. It cannot be directly enforced, but must 
be indirectly induced. Therefore, the MoF must provide the right incentives so that the LM 
produces the highest possible level of effort. The reason is that when one productivity level 
takes place, the LM could cheat by adjusting its effort so as to produce the output 
corresponding to the other productivity level. We define the effort level Le% such that ( ) ( ), ,LH L Le eα θ α θ=% .23 This means that, if i H= , the LM could exert a low effort Le% , thus 
produce Lx , while claiming to receive Lt . The “cheating rent” that the LM can get in that case 
is thus equal to ( ) ( ) 0LL H Ht e t eψ ψ⎡ ⎤− − − >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦% . To ensure that it is never optimal for the 
MoF to shut down the contract in case of low productivity, we also assume 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 , LL L Lq e e q eα θ ψ ψ− > − % . 
 
Traditional principal-agent models rely on incentive-compatible schemes to prevent such 
cheating. The well-known results from this literature apply and can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
At equilibrium, the LM does not cheat and gets no rent when i L= . In order to induce it into 
exerting the right effort level when i H= , the LM must receive an informational rent equal to 
                                                 
21 Superscript “*” stands for first-best values. 
22 This could be interpreted as an absorptive capacity constraint: when the state of nature is high, the LM must 
work harder to absorb a larger appropriation. 
23 To be complete, we should also define He%  such that ( ) ( ), ,HL H He eα θ α θ=% , i.e., the extra effort level the 
LM would need to exert so as to produce Hx  when i L= . However, this is never profitable for the LM, and is 
little relevant to our analysis. 
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( ) ( )SBSB LLe eψ ψ− %  (where superscript “SB” stands for “second best”) in addition to its first-
best transfer, where SBLe%  is such that ( ) ( ), ,SB SBLH L Le eα θ α θ=% . While production is efficient when 
i H= , the LM underproduces (compared to the full information benchmark) in case of low 
productivity: *SBL Le e< . Requiring a lower level of effort when i L=  enables the principal to 
decrease the informational rent granted to the LM when i H= . This reflects the “rent 
extraction/economic efficiency” trade-off, which characterizes adverse selection problems. 
 
If we define the agency cost incurred by the MoF as the difference in expected output due to 
the information asymmetry, this is equal to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* * *1 , ,SBSB SB SB SB SBLL L L L L L LAC E X E X q e e q e e e eψ ψ α θ α θ ψ ψ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − = − + − − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦%
 
The two main components of this expression are thus the rent granted to the LM when  
i H= , and the productive distortion occurring when  i L=  (minus the difference in 
compensation due to distortion). 
 
D.   Introducing Supervision 
In order to avoid forgoing the informational rent, the principal can hire a supervisor and 
reduce the information asymmetry. Usually, this is combined with the threat of penalty if 
cheating is detected. In introducing supervision, we will, in some respects, diverge from the 
existing literature on principal-agent, so as to better reflect PEM concerns. 
 
In the context of PEM, supervision may take various forms. One can distinguish internal 
controls (e.g., MoF or LM agents responsible for ensuring that expenditures and procurement 
are performed according to the rules), and external controls (e.g., a court of audit reporting to 
parliament). Controls may take place ex ante, (e.g., comptrollers issuing visas to allow 
expenditure, or automatic safeguards preventing LMs from exceeding budget 
appropriations),24 or ex post (e.g., auditors checking the reliability of fiscal data or the 
performance of public spending). Different types of controls can be combined. For instance, 
going back to the example of PEM systems in Africa, it is worth noting that the so-called 
Francophone system rests on the principle of separation between the person who initiates 
spending (the ordonnateur) and the person who pays it (the accountant or comptable). The 
system relies on centralized ex ante controls from the MoF, which take place at various stages 
of the expenditure process and mainly focus on the conformity of spending with regard to 
procedures and budget appropriation. Anglophone countries, on the other hand, have inherited 
a decentralized management system, where the LMs’ accounting officers are responsible for 
budget execution. Ex ante expenditure control is mainly exercised by the issue of periodic 
warrants by the MoF (cash management). The Anglophone system relies on independent, ex 
post controls by an auditor-general. In practice, however, notwithstanding those conceptual 
differences and institutional arrangements, both systems have proven to perform poorly 
(Bouley, Fournel, and Leruth, 2002; Moussa, 2004; and Lienert, 2003). 
 
                                                 
24 For example, if a government is not allowed to use an overdraft facility with the Central Bank, the rule can be 
interpreted as a safeguard.  
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In the next two sections, we introduce two types of supervision. We first study the case of ex 
post audits (Section IV), and explain how a standard principal-agent model with audit may be 
of interest for the design of PEM systems. We then move to ex ante controls (Section V). In 
doing so, we assume that ex ante controls increase the cost of cheating for the LM, as is done 
in the literature on collusion. Finally, at the end of Section V, we propose an integrated 
framework which combines both types of controls. 
 
 
IV.   EX POST AUDITS 
In this section, we introduce an ex post auditor, costing z  whether or not it identifies 
cheating.25 It could be an external or an internal auditor, in which case the audit cost may be 
interpreted as the opportunity cost of using MoF resources for controlling the LM, instead of 
doing other tasks. The auditor observes an imperfect signal on the LM’s effort (for instance, 
this may be done through a review of accounts to check if there has been corruption). We 
assume that the signal can take two values: “has complied” or “has cheated.” The latter occurs 
only when the LM has indeed cheated, while the signal can report compliance by mistake. 
The monitoring function is such that σ  denotes the probability of detecting actual cheating, in 
which case the LM is imposed an exogenous penalty P . With the introduction of supervision, 
the contract specifies not only the transfers and expected outputs (and thus, implicitly, the 
expected effort levels), but also the probability of audit. We assume that the MoF commits to 
audit with probability γ  after Lx  has been observed. When productivity is high, the LM may 
cheat with probability m . Given that output is low, the probability that the LM has cheated 
can be written as ( )/ 1qm q qmφ = − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . We also assume that the auditor is honest and does 
not collude with the LM.26 An appealing interpretation is that developing countries are often 
subject to donors’ external auditors, which are supposed to be honest (or not in a position to 
negotiate with the LM). 
 
Two of our assumptions deserve further discussion. First, while principal-agent models 
typically assume that the level of penalty is a decision parameter, we assume that it is fixed 
(for instance, legally bounded and difficult to change).27 We feel that, although a comparative 
static analysis can be done on the level of the penalty, in reality, social factors often limit the 
extent to which a penalty can be imposed in developing countries, where informal rules are 
predominant and society tolerates a certain amount of rent capture by public servants (see 
                                                 
25 Assuming the auditor is paid only when reporting cheating is not relevant in a PEM system, although there are 
many instances where a bonus is given when cheating is detected (for example, customs employees detecting a 
fraud have a right to a portion of the tax recovered in many countries). 
26 Note that this assumption is also made by Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) in their regime with one costly 
truthful auditor, as well as in Khalil (1997), for example. 
27 The maximum deterrence principle (Baron and Besanko, 1984), which implies that the principal would choose 
the upper bound penalty level, does not always apply, especially in models where the agent may be punished by 
mistake and thus must be compensated ex ante for that risk (e.g., in some regimes of Kofman and Lawarrée, 
1993). While this is irrelevant in our framework, we could have a situation (dubious and unlikely) where the 
principal’s benefit from the penalty is higher than the audit cost, so that it is preferable for the MoF to allow 
cheating than to deter it. Finally, the traditional result stating that with infinite penalty, cheating is deterred and 
the first-best solution is reached, could apply but, as we argue later, it is not of practical relevance for our 
purpose. 
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Dabla-Norris and Paul, 2006). It is not surprising therefore that most sub-Saharan African 
countries are characterized by a patrimonial state, lack of accountability, ineffective control 
procedures, and endemic corruption (e.g., Bayart, 1993; Dia, 1994; World Bank, 1997; 
Mbaku, 1998). This is due to various causes, including that “[formal institutions’] 
ineffectiveness is compounded by the absence of the rule-of-law as a third-party enforcement 
mechanism, engendering a climate in which enforcing formal contracts and procedures 
becomes costly, often prohibitively so, and sanctions for deviant behavior are devoid of 
credibility” (Dia, 1996, p. 1). 
 
Second, a crucial assumption used in the principal-agent literature is whether or not the 
principal can credibly commit to a given probability of audit at the time of offering the 
contract. We use this assumption in subsections A and B below. We relax it in subsection C, 
however, in order to capture the situation in institutional settings where the decision to audit is 
only taken ex post by the MoF. Hence, we discuss three possible regimes that the MoF can 
implement:28 (i) the “cheating-proof” regime, which corresponds to the optimal, incentive-
compatible contract when commitment is credible; (ii) the “cheating-inducing” regime, which 
is not optimal but, as we argue, matches the situation in some developing countries; and (iii) a 
“no commitment” case, in which there is no formal commitment to audit at the time of 
offering the contract, which results in a mixed strategy equilibrium. In subsection D, we 
discuss some applications of the model in terms of PEM and compare these regimes on the 
basis of their relative costs and benefits. 
 
A.   The Cheating-Proof Regime 
Traditional principal-agent models with credible commitment use the revelation principle to 
determine the optimal contract. The revelation principle asserts that, to find the optimal payoff 
of a problem with asymmetric information, one can, without loss of generality, restrict it to 
the incentive-compatible, individually rational scheme where every agent truthfully reveals 
his private information. To put it simply, this means that the principal can do no better than 
offer an incentive-compatible contract, which therefore deters cheating. Under these 
circumstances, the penalty is never imposed at equilibrium, but its existence out of the 
equilibrium path acts as a deterring threat and prevents cheating.29  
 
This approach is only applicable to settings in which the principal is able to credibly commit 
to any outcome of the contract. In a PEM system, the existence of a court of audit may be 
viewed as a commitment tool, enabling the MoF to make the credible commitment, at the time 
of offering the contract, that it will audit the LM at the end of the fiscal year with a given 
probability, which can be either probability one (systematic audit), or below one (random 
audit).30 Under this regime, there are conditions where the audit threat is such that it prevents 
the LMs from cheating. 
                                                 
28 We use a terminology similar to that of Eskeland and Thiele (1999) who refer to collusion-proof and 
collusion-inducing regimes, as we refer to cheating-proof and cheating-inducing regimes. 
29 This may seem a little remote from reality. However, the revelation principle characterizes the optimal payoffs 
and can be seen as the “truth-telling map” of a complex mechanism where cheating and punishments occur 
(Kofman and Lawarrée, 1993, p. 648). 
30 If there are several LMs, the latter situation could correspond to the case where the MoF announces it will 
audit a certain number of LMs—so that each LM knows, ex ante, with which probability it will be audited at the 
end of the year. 
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Formally, the MoF’s problem is to choose the levels of transfers, required efforts, and audit 
probability so as to maximize the expected output:31 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, , , ,
, 1 ,
H L H L
H H H L L Le e t t
Max E X q e t q e t zγ α θ α θ γ= − + − − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
 
Subject to IR(L), IR(H), and the following incentive compatibility (IC) constraint:32 
 
 ( ) ( )LH H Lt e t e Pψ ψ γσ− ≥ − −%  IC(H) 
 
Note that the term Pγσ  relaxes the IC(H) constraint, compared to the second-best case. 
Hence, provided its cost is not too high, we obtain the intuitive result that audit benefits the 
principal. 
 
As in Kofman and Lawarrée (1993), we find that the optimal contract exhibits qualitatively 
different types according to the value of the parameters (although the specific thresholds 
differ as we have slightly different assumptions; see Appendix II for proof and complete 
results). These types are characterized by different rents, productive distortions, and audit 
probabilities. The shift from one type to the other rests on a comparison between the expected 
benefits from audit (the penalty and reduction of rents and distortions) and its cost, with both 
the former and the latter depending on exogenous (country-specific) parameters. 
 
• If ( )1q P q zσ < − , audit is too costly relative to its benefits: it is therefore not optimal, 
and the principal can do no better than offer a second-best contract (by the revelation 
principle; see, e.g., Baron and Myerson, 1982). 
• When the benefits from audit increase, there is a point where they exactly offset its 
cost: ( )1q P q zσ = − . The MoF is then indifferent between auditing and not auditing. 
• When the benefits from audit exceed its cost, so that ( )1q P q zσ > − , it is profitable to 
audit. 
 
Some general results apply to all three cases. When the state of nature is i H= , production is 
always efficient, but the LM is granted an informational rent. When i L= , there is no rent, 
but the LM underproduces (compared to the first-best). IC(H) is binding (i.e., the MoF should 
not increase incentives above the point when it can deter cheating), and the issue is precisely 
to fulfil the IC(H) constraint at the lowest cost. Its shadow cost (the Lagrange multiplier) is 
                                                 
31 The probability of cheating and the expected penalty do not enter the principal’s objective function as, under 
this regime, cheating is deterred. However, the expected penalty appears in the IC constraint. 
32 To be complete, one should also introduce an IC(L) constraint, aimed at preventing the LM from producing 
the high output when productivity is low. This would take the form ( ) ( )HL L Ht e t eψ ψ− ≥ − % . But as is 
common in the literature, that constraint is redundant with the others and is therefore not relevant. Note also that, 
as we use the revelation principle and deter cheating, the optimal solution exhibits no cheating. The penalty is 
not collected in equilibrium and hence it does not enter the MoF’s objective function (although it is present in the 
constraints). 
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thus a crucial variable in determining the optimal institutional setting (we develop that 
argument in Section V).33 
 
When audit is efficient (last bullet), the optimal probability of audit, rents, and productive 
distortions vary and three sub-types can be identified:34 
 
? “Rent extraction” (RE) scheme: the MoF audits with probability 1, the production 
distortion when i L=  corresponds to the second-best solution, and the LM gets a rent 
when i H=  (the rent is equal to that of the second-best solution reduced by the expected 
penalty); 
? “Effort adjustment” (EA) scheme: the MoF still audits with probability 1, but the LM no 
longer gets a rent, and the productive distortion is lower compared to the second-best 
solution (i.e., the effort level lies between the second-best and the first-best solutions); 
? “Random audit” (RA): the MoF decreases the probability of audit (i.e., 0 1γ< < ) and still 
deters cheating, while the productive distortion is smaller than at the second-best.35 
 
As the general specifications of the functions do not allow us, for instance, to compute the 
exact boundaries between the regimes identified above, we illustrate these results using a 
numerical example such that 2 1 2x eθ=  and ( ) 3 / 3e eψ = . We can show that the EA and RA 
productive distortions when i L=  are smaller than at the second-best ( EA SBL Le e>  and 
RA SB
L Le e> ), and characterize the boundaries between the regimes (see Appendix II). In 
particular, if we define 
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we show that the RE scheme takes place when P Aσ ≤ , the EA scheme takes place when 
A P Bσ< ≤ , and the RA scheme takes place when P Bσ > . 
 
In other words, if it is efficient, audit reduces the agency costs (distortions and rents) 
associated with the second-best contract—while still deterring cheating. When the expected 
penalty is relatively low ( P Aσ ≤  in our numerical example), the MoF must use 
concomitantly other incentives to prevent cheating. For example, our model suggests that the 
LM could get a rent in case i H= , which would then lead to distorting production when 
                                                 
33 Note that, from the specification of that Lagrange multiplier (see Appendix II), one observes that the higher 
the cost of audit and/or the probability of low productivity, and the lower the penalty, the harder it is to deter 
cheating. 
34 Our results are consistent with the analysis of Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) with a truthful auditor. There are 
some slight differences however: (i) we assume the principal cannot earn a penalty out of a complying agent; (ii) 
we assume a fixed penalty; (iii) our specification of the production and disutility of effort functions differ, which 
hampers tractability. The labels also follow Kofman and Lawarrée (1993). 
35 The random audit case may be interpreted in a context with several LMs, where γ  represents the probability, 
for each LM, to be audited, in the framework of the general auditing policy of the MoF. 
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i L= . Nevertheless, audit enables the MoF to reduce the rent granted to the LM compared to 
the second-best level (hence the label “rent extraction”). When the expected penalty rises 
( A P Bσ< ≤  in our example), the threat increases for the LM so that the MoF can reduce the 
degree of mobilization of other incentives. In our model, the LM can no longer get a rent, and 
so the productive distortion can be reduced. Audit thus increases the effort requested from the 
LM in case of low productivity (hence the label “effort adjustment”). Also, when the expected 
penalty is large ( P Bσ >  in our example), the MoF can reduce the probability (thus the cost) 
of auditing (while still deterring cheating). Finally, there remains a production distortion when 
i L= , reflecting the trade-off between efficiency and the cost of audit. Box 1 below 
summarizes our findings (using the numerical example). 
 
As already mentioned, these results show that, when the expected penalty is relatively small, 
the MoF must concomitantly use other incentive tools, such as informational rents, in addition 
to audits to be able to prevent cheating. As the penalty threat increases, other incentives 
become less necessary. When the penalty is very high, even if the MoF reduces the 
probability of audit, the LM will not find it profitable to try to cheat. In developed countries, 
like France for instance, this principle is at the root of the “sampling” of expenditures and 
agencies to be audited. 
 
Finally, note that this model may also be adapted to take into account other constraints faced 
by the MoF. For example, we could think of a situation where the MoF is obliged to comply 
with some minimum requirements in terms of output (for example, the “Education for All 
Initiative,” or the provision of some basic health care package), so that it cannot tolerate that 
the LM produces below *Lx . The MoF would still have to fulfill IC(H) at the lowest cost 
(considering the additional constraint), which could be done through a trade-off between 




Box 1. Features of the Optimal, Cheating-Proof Contract 
 
- If ( )1q P q zσ < − , audit is not efficient ( 0γ = ) and the second-best contract is 
chosen. 
- If ( )1q P q zσ = − , the MoF is indifferent between auditing and not auditing. 
- If ( )1q P q zσ > − , audit is efficient ( 0γ > ) and the optimal contract may exhibit 
different types: 
o When P Aσ ≤ , the RE scheme is chosen: 1γ = , SBL Le e=  and the LM gets a 
rent when i H= . 
o When A P Bσ< ≤ , the EA scheme is chosen: 1γ = , EA SBL Le e>  and the LM gets 
no rent. 
o When P Bσ > , the RA scheme is chosen: 0 1γ< < , RA EA SBL L Le e e> >  and the LM 
gets no rent. 
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B.   The Cheating-Inducing Regime 
When audit is not optimal, we have seen that the MoF should offer the second-best contract, 
which is characterized by an informational rent paid to the LM when the state of nature is 
high. However, in reality, there may be circumstances preventing the MoF from offering that 
contract. For instance, the MoF may not be in a position to grant an informational rent when 
the budgeting system is input-based (line-item), or if it is confronted to a tight cash constraint. 
Besides, one fundamental difference between private sector operations (which have typically 
been used to illustrate the principal-agent theory) and public sector operations is often that 
output is easier to quantify when it is sold on the market. Public sector output often is not easy 
to quantify and must then be estimated at high cost and with uncertainty (how many children 
have actually learned to read and write, how many have been vaccinated). 
 
There may also be political pressure or legal constraints forcing the MoF to use ex post 
controls by the court of audit, even if it is not efficient. For instance, nearly all sub-Saharan 
African countries possess a court of audit. Yet, findings from Country Financial 
Accountability Assessments (CFAAs) show that these institutions often suffer from important 
weaknesses, ranging from lack of independence to poor capacity (World Bank, 2004b), which 
impairs their ability to deter cheating in a significant manner. The solution recommended by 
the principal-agent theory is to grant LMs premiums so as to induce them not to cheat. But 
this solution is hardly (if at all) observed in reality. Rather, one often observes the coexistence 
of a weak supreme audit institution and high levels of cheating (including corruption), with 
few positive incentives such as performance premiums.  
 
To look into cases where there exists a court of audit, which is not effective in deterring 
cheating, we now introduce a “cheating-inducing” regime: the MoF uses audit, but is not able 
to deter cheating. We are aware that this regime is not optimal for the principal with respect to 
the constraints usually considered in the literature, as it could get the same output without 
incurring the cost of audit. However, we believe that it adequately reflects the situation of 
some developing countries (see subsection D on that issue). Therefore, we consider the case 
in which the MoF audits, but the penalty and audit probability are such that 
( ) ( )LH H Lt e t e Pψ ψ γσ− < − −% . In that case, it is always in the interest of the LM to cheat 
when feasible, and the actual output is always low. As audit takes place, penalties will be 
imposed at equilibrium, but they will not be a threat sufficient to deter cheating. To come 
back to the model, the cheating-inducing regime takes place when the MoF commits to audit 
with a probability ( ) ( )** /CI LLe e Pγ ψ ψ σ⎡ ⎤< −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦%  (the superscript “CI” stands for “cheating-
inducing”). The production is low, but nevertheless corresponds to the first-best solution and 
there is no rent.36 The agency cost incurred is given 
by ( ) ( ){ } ( )* * * *CI CIH L H LAC q x x e e q P zψ ψ γ σ⎡ ⎤= − − − − −⎣ ⎦ . 
 
Characterizing the cheating-inducing regime is interesting in that it helps understand the 
reasons why the MoF is unable to deter cheating. This happens in the following cases: 
 
                                                 
36 The latter results are explained by the fact that if the MoF is not able to deter cheating, it is not worth incurring 
further distortions and agency costs. 
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• The audit probability CIγ  is deliberately chosen at a level that is too low. 
• The parameters preclude sufficient audit—in particular, if the expected penalty is low 
compared to the rent, the theoretical γ  which would help deter cheating may turn out to 
be higher than unity, which is irrelevant; this case may also occur when the effectiveness 
of audit (σ ) is too low. 
• The MoF does not make use of concomitant incentives (e.g. rents and distortions). 
Finally, note that in this case, the agency cost mostly consists of a loss of production when 
i H= . Besides, if z q Pσ> , audit also increases the agency cost. The weight of this 
component could increase when the MoF supervises several LMs. For instance, if some 
ministries are less critical than others, and could reasonably function with low production 
levels, agency costs could be reduced by offering cheating-inducing contracts and save on 
auditing costs. The money saved could be used to provide the incentives to the priority LMs 
and offer them a cheating-proof contract, thus ensuring high production (when i H= ) in 
these sectors. 
 
C.   The Case of “No Commitment” 37 
So far, we have considered that the MoF could credibly commit, at the time of offering the 
contract, to audit the LM with a given probability once output is observed. However, 
commitment to audit suffers from a time inconsistency problem: the contract determined by 
the revelation principle is optimal ex ante, but entails inefficiencies ex post. Indeed, as the 
contract deters cheating, the audit cost must be incurred without any compensation in terms of 
collected penalty. Moreover, as the contracted effort is not efficient when i L= , one obtains a 
Pareto improvement by renegotiating the contract once information has been revealed. This 
time inconsistency reduces the credibility of the commitment to audit, all the more if the MoF 
is facing a tight budget constraint.38 Other reasons may also contribute to preclude the 
commitment to audit, for instance, the difficulty of verifying whether the principal did indeed 
abide by its committed random audit strategy (Mookherjee and Png, 1989), or, in practice, the 
absence of adequate legal institutions. In particular, we have so far assumed that the existence 
of a court of audit in the country consisted in a commitment control. Yet, the inefficiency of 
the court of audit and related institutions may reduce the credibility of the commitment. 
Nevertheless, in such situations where the MoF cannot credibly commit to auditing, it can call 
upon some external auditors for specific tasks. 
 
                                                 
37 Mixed-strategy equilibriums have generally been used in the literature on collusion. The latter suggests that, 
instead of trying to systematically deter (or induce) collusion, it may be efficient to allow it to some extent (e.g., 
Kofman and Lawarrée, 1996; Khalil, 1997; Khalil and Lawarrée, 2003). This may be the case, for example, if 
there is a positive probability that the agent and the supervisor are honest, so that it may be too costly to provide 
incentives to systematically deter collusion. We hereafter apply a similar approach to cheating (corruption). We 
do not model it, but in a context with several LMs, the mixed-strategy equilibrium could also yield the optimal 
contract when some LMs are honest while others are corrupt, because preventing cheating as if all LMs were 
corrupt would be too costly. 
38 This argument holds in one-period games. However, in the context of repeated relationships, it is probably in 
the MoF’s interest not to backtrack on its promise to audit with the announced probability, in order to preserve 
its reputation. 
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In this subsection, we drop the assumption that the MoF commits to auditing at the time of 
offering the contract. However, once output is observed, the MoF can decide to audit if it 
proves to be efficient ex post, i.e., if the MoF expects to get “value-for-money” out of the 
audit. Indeed, when the output is produced, it is too late to deter cheating—but the MoF can 
still earn a penalty if cheating is detected. The MoF will be willing to audit only if the 
expected penalty is at least equal to the audit cost. Moreover, the mere expectation that the 
MoF may audit will reduce the LM’s incentive to cheat. 
 
Formally, with no commitment, the revelation principle cannot be used and audit must be ex 
post optimal to justify its cost. Hence, cheating may occur in equilibrium (i.e., the probability 
of cheating is positive), and the MoF can expect to collect a penalty. The MoF’s problem is to 
choose the levels of transfers, effort, and audit probability so as to maximize its objective 
function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, , , ,
1 , 1 ,
H L H L
H H H L L Le e t t
Max E X q m e t q qm e t P zγ α θ α θ γ φσ= − − + − + − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
 
Subject to IR(L) and the following constraints: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 0LH H Lm t e m t e Pψ ψ γσ⎡ ⎤− − + − − ≥⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦%  IR(H) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
'
arg max 1 ' ' LH H L
m
m m t e m t e Pψ ψ γσ⎡ ⎤∈ − − + − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦%  IC(H) 
 ( )
'
arg max ' P z
γ
γ γ φσ∈ −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  IC(A) 
 
Note that, compared to the previous cases, the MoF’s objective function and the constraints 
now encompass the probability of cheating by the LM (subsections A and B correspond to 
corner solutions of this general problem). The two IC constraints consist of indifference 
conditions and determine the game, which is played simultaneously by the MoF and the LM. 
Indeed, the LM is indifferent between cheating and being honest when 
( ) ( )LH H Lt e t e Pψ ψ γσ− = − −% . The MoF observes Lx , and is indifferent between auditing 
and not auditing when P zφσ = . 
 
This problem yields a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Under this regime, production is efficient 
and the LM gets no rent.39 The equilibrium is obtained when the MoF audits with probability 
( ) ( )** /LLe e Pγ ψ ψ σ⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦% , and the LM cheats with probability ( ) ( )1 /m z q P z qσ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . 
The mixed-strategy equilibrium is associated to an agency cost given by 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }* * * *1MS H L H Lz qAC x x e eP z ψ ψσ − ⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦−  (where superscript “MS” stands for “mixed 
strategy”). Note that penalties are collected at equilibrium, but they do not explicitly enter into 
the agency cost, because they are exactly offset by the cost of audit. Moreover, as it entails no 
                                                 
39 The efficiency result is similar to that of Khalil and Lawarrée (2003) and rests on the assumption that the 
penalty is independent from the transfer. The audit probability is increased until the rent is reduced to zero, and 
there is no reason to distort efforts. With transfer-dependent penalties, Khalil (1997) finds the agent 
overproduces when the productivity is low. 
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production distortion, the mixed-strategy equilibrium tends to the first best when the penalty 
is very large, or audit is free.40 
 
To our knowledge, the literature has not attempted to directly compare regimes with and 
without commitment, because commitment to audit is usually considered desirable as it 
reduces the ex ante cost of inducing truthful reporting (Baron and Besanko, 1984). The 
limited commitment due to the possibility of renegotiating a contract is typically handled by 
using the renegotiation-proofness principle. The latter, which is somewhat similar to the 
revelation principle, says that one can, without loss of generality, restrict the set of possible 
contracts to the class of contracts that are not renegotiated. Renegotiation-proof constraints 
are thus added to the set of IRs and ICs (e.g., Bolton, 1990; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1990; 
but see also Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey, 1994). In practice, commitment may entail some 
costs, including those linked to the creation of an adequate institutional setting such as the 
creation of a court of audit. Our framework allows comparing the agency costs associated 
with each regime. For instance, one observes that the agency cost of our mixed-strategy 
equilibrium consists mainly of the loss of production (when i H=  and the agent cheats). 
However, when external audits are cheap, and/or the expected penalty is large, the cheating 
probability decreases and the mixed strategy becomes a better option. This could reduce the 
value of establishing a court of audit if it does not yet exist in the country. 
 
D.   Applying the Theoretical Framework to PEM Systems 
The sections above explain the different control regimes the MoF can implement, according 
(notably) to the audit probability it chooses. The optimality of these regimes depends on the 
value of exogenous, country-specific parameters, such as the level of penalty, the quality of 
the supervision technique, the cost of audit, and the probability of high productivity. This 
suggests that the need to base the choice of the control design on a good analysis cannot be 
overemphasized and limits the applicability of  “one-size-fits-all” solutions. In this respect, 
our model provides an analytical framework that can guide PEM reforms, as it allows for 
comparing different institutional designs, while taking into account the constraints faced by 
governments. 
 
Generally speaking, the MoF should choose the audit regime associated with the lowest 
agency cost. Yet, the regimes vary with the institutional setting. The cheating-proof regime 
corresponds to a situation where the MoF can credibly commit ex ante to auditing with a 
given probability, for instance if a court of audit exists. This regime can be compared directly 
with the second-best contract, and the choice will depend on the ratio ( )/ 1q P q zσ − . The 
mixed strategy relies on a different assumption: there is no commitment, but the MoF can 
choose ex post whether to resort to external auditors for specific tasks. To compare these two 
frameworks, one should add the fixed cost of setting up and running the institutions necessary 
                                                 
40 Our results are quite intuitive. Both the probability of audit and the probability of cheating are decreasing 
functions of the expected penalty. The more cheating rent the LM can capture, the more the MoF audits. The 
more expensive the audit is, the more the LM cheats. The cheating probability is also influenced by the relative 
probabilities of the productivity occurrences: to keep the MoF indifferent between auditing and not auditing, 
cheating is increasing with the probability of low productivity. The agency cost decreases with the expected 
penalty and increases with the probability of low productivity. It is also higher when the difference of production 
between i H=  and i L=  is higher. 
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to allow commitment (e.g., the cost of creating a court of audit) to the agency cost of the 
cheating-proof regime.  
 
In theory all the regimes discussed above could be implemented. In practice, however, 
additional constraints may restrain the choices available to the MoF, especially in developing 
countries. On the one hand, several factors may contribute to reducing the ratio 
( )/ 1q P q zσ − , which conditions the value of audit in those countries. The penalty faced by 
LMs when cheating is detected may be very small or rarely enforced (see, e.g., Dia, 1996; 
Lienert, 2003; Moussa, 2004), all the more if discounted at a high rate (because of the time 
required for implementation) and if the supervision technology is not performing well (low 
σ , for instance due to poor fiscal data; see, e.g., Bouley, Fournel, and Leruth, 2002); the 
probability of high output may be low, compared to that expected in industrial countries; and 
the opportunity cost of audit may be high, considering the scarcity of competent human 
resources. Therefore, while the MoF can probably deter cheating through ex post audits in 
industrial countries, this may not be so easy in developing countries. 
 
Practical constraints may also restrict the MoF’s actions: 
 
• A tight cash constraint and/or the framework of line item budgeting may limit the 
availability of informational rents.41  
• The government may have committed to provide a minimum package of services, which 
prevents production distortions below a certain level (the level obtained under the 
optimal contract). 
• The MoF may be legally or politically obliged to resort to the court of audit, even if it is 
not working well. 
Finally, if audit is not efficient (due to a low ratio ( )/ 1q P q zσ − ) and if the MoF cannot 
enforce the second-best contract (for practical reasons), it can only implement the cheating-
inducing regime: the most unfavorable for the MoF, and a regime that is never optimal. 
Note that our analytical framework may be extended to evaluate various reforms. One can 
think of reforms to increase the quality of audit, or to use signalling to help determine 
productivity (e.g., collecting economic information on the sector, and/or auditing the quality 
of the approved program design).  
 
 
V.   EX ANTE CONTROLS42 
We have so far considered that, notwithstanding the risk of being caught ex post, cheating is 
costless for the agent. This assumption is common in the literature because the cheating rent 
generally consists of a reduction in the effort made by the agent, which remains his private 
                                                 
41 Informational rents could be envisaged in a system of performance budgeting, as they consist of rewarding the 
LM for good performance (above the compensation of its effort). 
42 This section deals with an issue not often discussed in principal-agent papers where the focus tends to be on 
controls run ex post. 
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information. But the LM’s effort may also comprise some negative actions (such as 
corruption), and this leads us to assume that cheating entails some costs to be concealed. This 
allows us to make the link with the economic literature on collusion in organizations.43 The 
literature distinguishes two types of collusion costs, according to whether they are exogenous 
(e.g., negotiation costs, “physical” strategies to divert monies from their intended purposes), 
or endogenous (e.g., costs stemming from the risk of future detection, see Faure-Grimaud, 
Laffont, and Martimort, 1999; Khalil and Lawarrée, 2003). Ways in which the principal can 
avoid corruption include (i) create incentive payments; (ii) decrease the stake of collusion; 
and (iii) increase the transaction cost of collusion (Laffont and Rochet, 1997). In this section, 
we introduce an exogenous cost of cheating and explain how it affects the constraints of the 
MoF’s problem. In a second step, we interpret ex ante controls, undertaken by the MoF before 
the commitment and/or the payment of LM’s expenditures, as increasing the cost of cheating. 
We then discuss the relative value of ex post and ex ante controls. 
 
A.   Exogenous Cost of Cheating 
We assume that the LM incurs a certain cost 0η ≥  when it cheats. That cost decreases the 
expected benefits from cheating. If we first consider a model without ex post audit, the MoF’s 
problem can be written as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, , ,
1 , 1 ,
H L H L
H H H L L Le e t t
Max E X q m e t q qm e tα θ α θ= − − + − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦   
 
Subject to IR(L) and: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 0LH H Lm t e m t eψ ψ η⎡ ⎤− − + − − ≥⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦%  IR(H) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
'
arg max 1 ' ' LH H L
m
m m t e m t eψ ψ η⎡ ⎤∈ − − + − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦%  IC(H) 
 
We observe that IC(H) is relaxed by the cost of cheating. If ( ) ( )LH H Lt e t eψ ψ η− < − −% , the 
LM will always cheat ( 1m = ), unless appropriate incentives are provided. For instance, the 
second-best contract in this case would also entail a rent when i H= , and a productive 
distortion when i L= , but these would be reduced by the cheating cost. If the cost of cheating 
is high enough and ( ) ( )LH H Lt e t eψ ψ η− > − −% , the LM will not cheat ( 0m = ) and the MoF 
will reach the first-best solution (no rent and efficient production, as IC(H) is not binding). It 
is thus in the MoF’s interest to increase the cost of cheating. This is discussed further in the 
next subsection. 
 
                                                 
43 Following Tirole (1986), that branch of the literature studies the potential for side-contracting between a 
privately informed, cheating agent and the supervisor hired by the principal to control him or her. 
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B.   Ex Ante Controls as Increasing the Cost of Cheating 
Most traditional principal-agent models consider monitoring at the ex post stage.44 Deterring 
cheating (or collusion) ex ante is done by granting rewards and/or through a threat of future 
punishment. For their part, PEM systems also include a series of controls designed to prevent 
agents from cheating ex ante. For example, automatic tools, such as computer-based systems 
checking the budget appropriations before allowing spending, are designed for that purpose, 
and a similar role is played by the financial comptrollers placed by the MoF within LMs. Such 
controls are particularly extensive in the Francophone Treasury system (Bouley, Fournel, and 
Leruth, 2002) but also exist in the Anglophone system (Diamond, 2002). As observation 
suggests, however, these control techniques are not perfect, partly because agents are very 
active in trying to bypass them (Lienert, 2003; Moussa, 2004). 
 
We hereafter interpret setting up ex ante controls implemented by the MoF as increasing the 
LM’s cost of cheating.45 We endogenize the cost of cheating as a decision variable of the MoF 
and first consider a model without ex post audit. 
 
Assume c  represents the cost of the ex ante controls. It may be interpreted as the cost of 
implementing and running controls, but also as the economic cost (sometimes heavy) of 
procedures that may complicate the expenditure process and reduce the LM’s absorptive 
capacity.46 The LM’s cost of cheating ( )cη  is now endogenous and depends on the controls 
implemented by the MoF. We assume 0cη > , 0ccη < , ( )0 0η = , and ( )limc cη→∞ = ∞ .47 We 
limit our analysis to the specification of incentive-compatible schemes (thus, where the MoF 
deters cheating). The MoF will decide on the levels of ex ante control, transfer, and effort so 
as to maximize its expected output, as follows: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, , , ,
, 1 ,
H L H L
H H H L L Le e t t c
Max E X q e t q e t cα θ α θ= − + − − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦   
 
Subject to IR(L), IR(H) (which now has the form: ( ) 0H Ht eψ− ≥ ), and 
                                                 
44 As an exception to this statement, Strausz (2006) compares the value of monitoring versus auditing. He argues 
that if both supervision techniques are equally efficient, auditing is (weakly) superior when the principal can 
commit to a verification strategy—as auditing can bring out additional information. However, when the 
principal’s verification behavior is noncontractible, monitoring may be optimal. This result is explained because 
auditing requires steeper incentives, which may be suboptimal if the agent is risk averse and/or due to higher 
rents. Our analysis differs from Strausz’s in that we do not assume that ex post audit and ex ante controls rely on 
the same technology, and we have assumed (in the cheating-proof regime) that the principal could commit to an 
audit strategy. 
45 The literature on collusion adopts a similar approach when it acknowledges that hiring a collusive auditor is 
still useful, because it makes shirking costly for the agent, as he will have to pay a bribe to falsify the report (e.g., 
Kofman and Lawarrée, 1996). 
46 For instance, in Senegal, the procedures for disbursing the Health Decentralization Fund are such that it takes 
on average 10 months for the resources to be at the disposal of the providers. This leaves only two months to the 
facility to absorb those resources (World Bank, 2004a). 
47 The more effective controls are, the higher ( )cη  for any 0c > . 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )LH H Lt e t e cψ ψ η− ≥ − −%  ( )IC H  
 
Relying on ex ante controls is different from ex post audits because: (i) the performance of ex 
ante controls is “intrinsic” (depending on η ), and does not depend on external factors like the 
level of penalty; (ii) the cost of controls is incurred ex ante, whatever the state of nature, while 
the cost of audit is incurred, if at all, only when a low output is observed; and (iii) the decision 
parameter of the MoF is bounded in the case of ex post audits while, in theory, the MoF could 
increase ex ante controls infinitely (although it would not be efficient to do so). 
 
The results and proofs related to this discussion are presented in Appendix III. Once again, the 
problem remains to respect IC(H) at the lowest cost, hence the importance of the shadow cost 
(Lagrance multiplier) of that constraint. We first show that it is not efficient to increase 
controls above the point where ( )1/ c c qη ≥⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . If the cost of deterring cheating by controls 
alone is too high (i.e., when the minimum level of control that would be necessary to deter 
cheating, ( ) ( )LLc t eη ψ= − % , would be such that ( )1/ c c qη >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ), the MoF must also use other 
means to deter cheating, including rents and productive distortions. For instance, the LM 
could be granted a rent when i H=  (the level of this rent decreases with the amount of  
control by the MoF) and be required to produce the second-best level of effort when i L= . In 
that case, the MoF’s expected output corresponds to the second-best solution. 
 
When ex ante controls are sufficiently effective to allow the MoF to deter cheating by raising 
controls (until a point such that ( )1/ c c qη <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ), the LM gets no rent. However, it may be 
profitable for the MoF to distort the required effort, if it can save by reducing the level of 
controls. The MoF would then choose the level of control and the effort required when i L=  
by comparing their cost (i.e., so as to relax IC(H) at the lowest cost). The trade-off here is 
between increased efficiency and the cost of control. The agency cost would then be equal to 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }* * *1AC AC ACL L L LAC q x x e e cψ ψ⎡ ⎤= − − − − +⎣ ⎦   (where the superscript “AC” stands for “ex 
ante controls”).  
 
The results do not fundamentally differ from the cheating-proof regime with ex post audits. 
Both types of control are assessed with regard to their ability to deter cheating, and if their 
cost is too high relative to their benefits, the MoF has to use other means (rents and 
distortions). Yet, one can compare the relative value of both types of controls on the basis of 
the shadow cost of each problem’s IC(H) constraint, i.e., the Lagrange multiplier of those 
constraints at equilibrium. These are respectively given by ( )1/AC c cλ η=  for ex ante controls, 
and ( )1 /EP q z Pγλ λ σ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦  for ex post audits, where γλ  represents the shadow cost of the 
constraint on the maximum audit probability 1γ = , (where the subscript “EP” stands for “ex 
post audits”).48 Both measure the difficulty of deterring cheating and determine the agency 
costs (cost of control, rents, and production distortions) associated with each regime. For 
instance, it is not profitable for the MoF to increase the level of ex ante controls 
                                                 
48 Under the random audit feature, 0γλ = . 
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when ( )1/ c c qη >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , nor to use ex post audits when ( )1 /q z P qγλ σ⎡ ⎤− + >⎣ ⎦ . An analysis of 
shadow costs reveals that both thresholds depend on the probability that i H= . It also reveals 
that the higher the probability of high output, the higher the incentive to use controls to 
guarantee it. Second, the effect of ex post audits on relaxing the constraint IC(H) is mitigated 
by the size of the expected penalty. As already mentioned, penalties are low and/or not 
enforced in developing countries, and ex post audits may not be able to deter cheating, 
making ex ante controls more effective. Third, if penalties are a credible threat, ex post audits 
may prove to be effective because their cost is incurred only when the principal observes a 
low output (i.e., with probability ( )1 q− under a cheating-proof regime) contrary to ex ante 
controls which are imposed in a nondiscriminatory manner. 
 
C.   Integrating Ex Ante and Ex Post Controls 
We now briefly consider (without explicitly solving) the case in which the MoF can deter 
cheating through a  combination of ex ante controls and ex post audits.49 Limiting ourselves to 
incentive compatible schemes, the MoF’s problem is to maximize the expected output: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, , , , ,
, 1 ,
H L H L
H H H L L Le e t t c
Max E X q e t q e t z cγ α θ α θ γ= − + − − − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
 
Subject to IR(L), IR(H) and: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )LH H Lt e t e c Pψ ψ η γσ− ≥ − − −%  ( )IC H  
 
We have already solved both components of this problem separately, through the optimization 
of the MoF’s problem with respect to the audit probability and the control cost, respectively. 
Under a combined approach, the most interesting case occurs when the MoF simultaneously 
uses both types of controls. This may only take place when 
( ) ( )1/ 1 /c c q z P qγλ η λ σ⎡ ⎤= = − + ≤⎣ ⎦ . This may be interpreted as linking the cost-
effectiveness of each type of control and comparing their costs (resp. c  and ( )1 q z γλ⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦ ) 
to their effectiveness in deterring cheating (which depends on η  and Pσ ). When the MoF 
uses both audits and controls in combination, it will thus equate the relative contribution of 
each type of control. Finally, the optimal level of ex ante controls and probability of ex post 
                                                 
49 We could extend the analysis to a case in which the MoF would like to implement a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium with respect to ex post audit, while also using ex ante controls. Compared to the case presented in 
subsection IV.C., the audit probability that keeps the LM indifferent between cheating and complying would be 
reduced by the use of ex ante controls: ( ) ( ) ( )** /LLe e c Pγ ψ ψ η σ⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦% . However, the probability of cheating 
would not be influenced by the introduction of ex ante controls, as its equilibrium value is determined by 
keeping the MoF indifferent between auditing and not auditing: ( ) ( )1 /m z q P z qσ= − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . We know 
that the agency cost associated with the mixed strategy is such that the cost of audit offsets the benefits from 
penalty. This would still hold in this case, so that the cost of ex ante controls would not have any counterpart 
benefit, neither in terms of reduced cheating, nor in terms of collected penalty. Therefore, our model suggests 
that when it chooses to implement a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the MoF should not use ex ante controls at the 
same time. 
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audits, as well as the production distortion when i L=  and the possible rent when i H= , will 
be determined simultaneously, so as to satisfy the constraint IC(H) at the lowest cost. 
 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
We have argued that the principal-agent theory offers a powerful analytical framework to 
better understand PEM systems and guide their design in developing countries. The model 
discussed in the paper equally applies to “managerial” systems relying on ex post audits (in 
the British tradition), or systems relying more on ex ante controls (in many Francophone 
African countries). It allows for comparisons between institutional settings (e.g., depending 
on whether or not the MoF is able to commit to a certain audit probability) and types of 
control (e.g., comparing the effectiveness of ex post audits and ex ante controls) by examining 
the cost-effectiveness of various tools available to the principal to deter cheating. However, 
this often entails some productive distortions, which result from a trade-off between economic 
efficiency, on the one hand, and the cost of control and/or an informational rent, on the other 
hand. Finally, we have interpreted corruption and the lack of governance as “rents” captured 
by the LMs at the expense of their principal as a result of the informational advantage. By 
assuming that the agent’s effort encompasses productive effort, as well as negative actions 
such as those related to corruption, we have linked the model to the literature on collusion in 
organizations. 
 
The model shows that several regimes can exist and their optimality depends on country-
specific parameters, hence the importance of basing the choice of a PEM system on a detailed 
analysis. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw a few general lessons that can help PEM advisors 
address some important issues: 
 
• Ex post controls (which we mostly assimilate to a court of audit in the paper) should be 
used up to the point where their marginal cost is equal to their return in terms of improved 
economic efficiency. This will depend on several parameters such as arbitrarily low or 
ineffective penalties (often the result of social pressure or a weak judicial system in 
developing countries). Rather than setting up a court of audit (they do not exist in all 
countries), it may then be profitable to rely on other tools such as external, private audit 
firms, which increase the cost of cheating for the LMs. In certain conditions, we also 
stress the importance of setting up a court of audit so as to make the commitment 
assumption credible and, in conjunction with better funding, increase its activities, thereby 
increasing the deterring aspect of the threat of punishment. 
• The effectiveness of internal controls is similarly determined by cost-benefit 
considerations, but money spent on internal controls tends to be more effective than 
money spent on ex post controls in developing countries. An important parameter is the 
extent to which these controls can be bypassed, for example through the use of 
extraordinary procedures. The cost of internal controls should be assessed carefully, 
taking into account not only the cost of additional controllers or systems, but also the 
economic cost due to the resulting slow down of the expenditure process. 
• In countries where the efficiency of both internal and external controls is dubious, theory 
recommends that the LM should be granted an “informational rent” in the form of a 
transfer above the compensation for the effort made. However, in practice, and beyond the 
difficulty of implementing such schemes in a public sector context in many countries, the 
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efficiency of informational rents may be reduced if appropriate performance measures on 
which to base the contract between the MoF and the LM are unreliable or even 
unavailable. 
• The model may also help sequencing reforms, although we do not develop this aspect in 
the paper. As causes for the poor performance of the PEM system are identified, it is 
possible to decide on what measures should take priority. For instance, if the MoF is not 
in a position to deter cheating by introducing internal controls, nor to grant informational 
rents, it is trapped in the so-called cheating-inducing regime. A first step could be to 
announce that private audit firms will be hired. In our model, this would relate to 
implementing a mixed-strategy equilibrium, which tends to be an easily implementable 
and cheaper solution (as it incurs no fixed cost) to reduce the extent of cheating. If the 
country lacks reliable fiscal data, ex post audits are not very effective and the priority 
should be to reinforce the accounting system, before reinvigorating the court of audit.  
Finally, although the principal-agent theory provides very interesting insights for the design of 
PEM systems, we have only considered a few aspects and many more are worth exploring. 
For instance, a principal-agent analysis could be applied to the allocation of resources for 
control purposes between different LMs (for example because they have different 
probabilities of cheating). Future research could also focus on the dynamic aspects of PEM 
design and take into account the repeated interactions between the MoF and LMs at the time 
the contract is prepared. Although not easily tractable, the realities of the negotiation process 
between the MoF and the LMs are very complex, with some LMs being better informed than 
others.  







Expenditure Tracking Indicators and Benchmarks 
 
 
Public Expenditure Management Issue Benchmark Description 
 1. Composition of the budget entity 
 
Very close fit to government finance statistics (GFS) 
definition of general government 
 2. Limitations to the use of off-budget 
transactions 
Extra (or off) budget expenditure is not significant 
 
 3. Reliability of budget as guide to outturn 
 
Level and composition of outturn is “quite close” to 
budget 
 4. Data on donor financing 
 
Donor-funded expenditures are included in budget or 
reports 
 5. Classification of budget transactions Functional and/or program information provided 
 6. Identification of poverty-reducing 
expenditure 








 7. Quality of multiyear expenditure 
projections 
Projections are integrated into budget formulation 
 
 8. Level of payment arrears Very few or no arrears accumulated 
 9. Quality of internal audit Effective internal audit function 






 11. Quality of fiscal/banking data 
reconciliation 
Satisfactory and timely reconciliation of fiscal and 
monetary data  
 12. Timeliness of internal budget reports Monthly expenditure reports provided within four 
weeks of end of month 
 13. Classification used for tracking 
poverty-reducing expenditures 
Good quality, timely functional reporting derived 
from classification system 





 15. Timeliness of final audited accounts 
 












16. Effective procurement  Procurement processes promote competition, 
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APPENDIX II 
 
The Cheating-Proof Regime with Ex Post Audits50 
 
We first present the general case before deriving some specific results from a numerical 
example. 
 
1.    General case 
 
The optimal, incentive-compatible contract problem has the following Lagrangian: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 4
, 1 ,
1
H H H L L L
LH H L L H H L
L q e t q e t z
t e t e t e t e P
α θ α θ γ
λ ψ λ ψ λ ψ ψ γσ λ γ
= − + − − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ − + − + − − + + + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦%
 
 
with the additional non-negativity constraints. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximization are (directly considering the efforts and 
transfers are positive, so that the associated conditions hold with equality): 
 
(2.1) ( ) ( ) ( )1 3, 0e H H e H
H
L q e e
e
α θ λ λ ψ∂ = − + =∂  ; 
(2.2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 31 , 0Le L L e L
L L
eL q e e
e e
ψα θ λ ψ λ ∂∂ = − − + =∂ ∂
%
 ; 




λ λ∂ = − + + =∂  ; 




λ λ∂ = − − + − =∂  ; 
(2.5) ( ) 3 41 0L q z Pλ σ λγ
∂ = − − + − ≤∂  and 0
Lγ γ
∂ =∂  ; 
plus the constraints and their complementary slackness conditions. 
 
From (2.5), audit is not efficient ( 0γ = ) when ( )3 1 q zPλ σ
−< . 
From (2.3), we know that 1 3q λ λ= + , so that 3 qλ ≤ . Thus, from (2.5), audit is optimal 
( 0γ > ) only if ( ) 43 1 q z qP
λλ σ
− += ≤ , and therefore ( ) 41 q z q Pλ σ− + ≤ . 
 
                                                 
50 This analysis and its results are very similar to that of Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) with one truthful costly 
auditor, at the following exceptions: (i) we assume the principal cannot earn a penalty out of a complying agent; 
(ii) we assume a fixed penalty; (iii) our specification of the production and disutility of effort functions differ. 
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Several general results may be drawn: 
 
? IC(H) is binding: either audit is not efficient, so that the second-best contract is chosen, 
and it is well-known that IC(H) is binding; or audit is efficient, and from (2.5) 3 0λ > , so 
that IC(H) is also binding. 
? IR(L) is binding: from (2.4), ( )2 31 0qλ λ= − + > , so that there is no rent when i L= . 
? Production is efficient when i H= : from (2.3), 1 3q λ λ= + ; replacing in (2.1), we find 
that ( ) ( ),e H H e He eα θ ψ= . 












% . From (2.4), we know ( )2 31 qλ λ= − + . Replacing in (2.2) yields: 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) [ ] ( )3 31 / , , 1L Le e H e L L e Lq e e e q eλ ψ α θ α θ λ ψ⎡ ⎤− + = − +⎣ ⎦% % . 
( ),e L Leα θ  could be equal to ( )e Leψ  only if 3 0λ =  (which is not possible: we have seen 
that IC(H) was always binding) or if ( ) ( ),L Le e He eψ α θ=% % . But we know that 
( ) ( ), , Le L L e He eα θ α θ< %  and ( ) ( )Le e Le eψ ψ<% , so that it is inconsistent. Hence, 
( ) ( ),L Le e He eψ α θ<% %  and ( ) ( ),e L L e Le eα θ ψ> . 
 
 
Three cases can occur according to the value of the parameters: 
 
1) If ( )1q P q zσ < − , audit is never optimal and, from the Revelation Principle, the second-
best contract is preferable. 
 
 
2) If ( )1q P q zσ = − , the MoF is indifferent between auditing and not auditing. 
 
From (2.5), we know that ( ) 3 41q P q z Pσ λ σ λ= − ≥ − , which is possible only if the latter 
equation holds with equality (otherwise 0γ =  and the second-best contract is optimal), and 
3 qλ =  and 4 0λ =  so that 0 1γ< < . 
Replacing 3λ  in (2.2), one has: ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( )1 / , ,L Le e H e L L e Lq q e e e eψ α θ α θ ψ⎡ ⎤− + =⎣ ⎦% % . The 
production distortion when i L=  is SBLe  (second-best). 
As 3 qλ = , we know from (2.3) that 1 0λ = , so that there is a rent when i H= . 
The problem is undetermined and the MoF is indifferent between auditing with probability 
( ) ( ) ( )*0 / 1SBEP SB LH L He e e t Pγ ψ ψ ψ σ⎡ ⎤< = + − − <⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦%  and leaving a rent equal to 
( ) ( ) ( )* SBSB EPLH H Lt e e e Pψ ψ ψ γ σ= + − −%  when i H= , or offering the second-best contract. 
In this case, the MoF’s expected output and the agency cost incurred correspond to the 
second-best solution. 





3) If ( )1q P q zσ > − , audit is efficient and the optimal contract may exhibit different types. 
 
From (2.5), we know that ( )3 4 1P q zλ σ λ− = − . Three cases may arise:51 
 
- 3 qλ =  (therefore 1 0λ = ) and 4 0λ >  (therefore 1γ = ): “Rent extraction” (RE); 
- 3 qλ <  (therefore 1 0λ > ) and 4 0λ >  (therefore 1γ = ): “Effort adjustment” (EA); 
- 3 qλ <  (therefore 1 0λ > ) and 4 0λ =  (therefore 1γ < ): “Random audit” (RA). 
 
We characterize the three contracts hereafter. 
 
 
a. Systematic audit and “rent extraction” (RE) 
 
When 3 qλ =  and ( )1q P q zσ > − , we know from (2.5) that 4 0λ > , which means that the 
MoF audits with probability one: 1γ = . 
Replacing 3λ  in (2.2), we find that the production distortion when i L=  is the same as at 
the second-best: SBLe . 
From (2.3), we also know that 1 0λ = , so that IR(H) is not binding and there is a rent when 
i H= . The corresponding transfer is ( ) ( ) ( )* SBSB LH H Lt e e e Pψ ψ ψ σ= + − −% . 
The MoF’s expected output is thus: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *, 1 ,SBRE SB SB SBLH H H L L L LE X q e e e e P q e e zα θ ψ ψ ψ σ α θ ψ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − + + + − − −⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦% . 
The agency cost incurred is equal to ( )1RE SBAC AC q P q zσ= − + − . 
 
 
b. Systematic audit and “effort adjustment” (EA) 
 
When 3 qλ < , we know from (2.3) that 1 0λ > , so that IR(H) is binding and there is no rent 
when i H= : ( )*H Ht eψ= . 
As long as 4 0λ > , the MoF audits with probability one: 1γ = . 
However, from (2.2) we know that 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) [ ] ( )3 31 / , , 1L Le e H e L L e Lq e e e q eλ ψ α θ α θ λ ψ⎡ ⎤− + = − +⎣ ⎦% % , which suggests that the 
                                                 
51 These cases are similar to those found by Kofman and Lawarrée (1993), and we use the same labels as these 
authors. 
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productive distortion is smaller than at the second-best.52 The latter is defined by IC(H) in 
such a way that ( ) ( )EAEA LLe e Pψ ψ σ= +% . 
The MoF’s expected output is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *, 1 ,EA EA EAH H H L L LE X q e e q e e zα θ ψ α θ ψ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
The agency cost incurred is equal to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* *1 , ,EA EA EAL L L L L LAC q e e e e zα θ α θ ψ ψ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − − − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
 
 
c. Random audit (RA) 
 
When 4 0λ = , the MoF audits with probability below one (random audit): 0 1γ< < . 
From (2.5), we know that ( )3 1 q z qPλ σ
−= < . Replacing in (2.2) and dividing by ( )1 q− : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 / , , 1L Le e H e L L e Lz ze e e eP Pψ α θ α θ ψσ σ⎧ ⎫ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤+ = +⎨ ⎬ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭ ⎣ ⎦% % . This equality defines the 
productive distortion RALe . 
As 1 0λ > , IC(H) is binding, and we may determine ( ) ( ) /RARA RA LLe e Pγ ψ ψ σ⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦% . 
In this case, the MoF’s expected output is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *, 1 ,RA RA RA RAH H H L L LE X q e e q e e zα θ ψ α θ ψ γ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
The agency cost incurred is equal to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* *1 , ,RA RA RA RAL L L L L LAC q e e e e zα θ α θ ψ ψ γ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − − − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
 
 
The example below allows us to show that, with a consistent formulation of the productive 
and disutility of effort functions, the EA and RA productive distortions are smaller than at the 
second-best. We can also characterize the boundaries between the different regimes. 
 
 
2.    Example 
 
Let 2 1 2x eθ=  and ( ) 3 / 3e eψ = , which respect our assumptions regarding the signs of the 
derivatives of both functions. 
 
The Lagrangian is now: 
 
                                                 
52 The general formulation of the productive and disutility of effort functions do not allow us to prove that the 
EA and RA productive distortions are always smaller than the second-best one. For this purpose, we use an 
example below. 




( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 12 2
2 2
3 3 3 12 3




3 3 3 3
H H H L L L
H L H L H L
H L H L
L q e t q e t z
e e e e
t t t t P
θ θ γ
θ θλ λ λ γσ λ γ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − + − + − − + + + −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximization are now ((2.3), (2.4) and (2.5) are similar): 
 
(2.1)’ ( ) ( ) ( )( )12 22 1 31 02 H H HH
L q e e
e
θ λ λ−∂ ⎡ ⎤= − + =⎢ ⎥∂ ⎣ ⎦  
(2.2)’ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )12 2 12 22 2 31 1 / 02 L L L L H LL
L q e e e
e
θ λ λ θ θ−∂ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − + =⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦∂ ⎣ ⎦  
 
The general results are similar to the general case: IC(H) and IR(L) are binding; production is 
efficient when i H= ; there is underproduction when i L= . Moreover: 
 




e θ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 

















⎧ ⎫−⎪ ⎪ ⎡ ⎤= < =⎨ ⎬ ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦− + −⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
 when 
















⎧ ⎫−⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬⎡ ⎤−⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
. 
- The productive distortion under “effort adjustment” (EA) is smaller than at the 
second-best: this results derives from the two expressions of the effort above, knowing 
that 3 qλ <  and L Hθ θ< , so that EA SBL Le e> . 
- More precisely, the productive distortion under “effort adjustment” is defined by IC(H) in 
such a way that ( ) ( )EAEA LLe e Pψ ψ σ= +% , i.e. 
( )( )














θ θ θ σ
λ θ θ
⎧ ⎫−⎪ ⎪ ⎡ ⎤− =⎨ ⎬ ⎣ ⎦⎡ ⎤− + −⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
. From this equation, we can 









⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
- From (2.5) and (2.2)’, we find that the effort required when i L=  under “random audit” 













= ⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤+ −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
. As ( )1  q P q zσ > −  and L Hθ θ< , it is 
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easy to show that RA SBL Le e> , which means that the productive distortion under random 
audit is also smaller than at the second-best. 
- From IC(H),we may determine the audit probability under the RA scheme: 













⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦= ⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤+ −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
. 
 
This example allows us to determine the boundaries between the different regimes. Let 













⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ≡
⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦
 and 














⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦ ≡⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤+ −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
 (Note that 
A B< ). 
 
Proposition: 
- The RE scheme takes place when P Aσ ≤  
- The EA scheme takes place when A P Bσ< ≤  




- To satisfy IR(H) under the RE scheme, one must have ( ) ( ) 0SBSB LLe e Pψ ψ σ− − ≥% , and 













θσ θ θθ θ
⎧ ⎫−⎪ ⎪ ⎡ ⎤≤ − ≡⎨ ⎬ ⎣ ⎦⎡ ⎤−⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
. 
 
- To satisfy 1RAγ <  under the RA scheme, one must have 














⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦> ≡⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤+ −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
. 
 
- The EA scheme is the only one which corresponds to A P Bσ< ≤ . 
Under EA, the productive distortion is smaller than at the second-best ( EA SBL Le e> ), if 
P Aσ > , and it is higher than at the RA ( RA EAL Le e>  ) if P Bσ < . It is easy to show that the 
EA scheme satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (2.1) and (2.2). 
 
 
- Finally, the problem is continuous: 
o SB-RE: the productive distortion is similar, the difference arises from the fact that 
Pσ  reduces the rent. 
o RE-EA: the productive distortion is similar ( EA SBL Le e= ) at P Aσ =  and 3 qλ = . 
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− = . 
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The Cheating-Proof Regime with Ex Ante Controls 
The optimal, incentive-compatible contract problem has the following Lagrangian: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
1 2
3
, 1 ,H H H L L L H H L L
LH H L
L q e t q e t c t e t e
t e t e c
α θ α θ λ ψ λ ψ
λ ψ ψ η
= − + − − − + − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ − − − −⎣ ⎦%
 
with the additional non-negativity constraints. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximization are (directly considering the efforts and 
transfers are positive, so that the associated conditions hold with equality): 
 
(3.1) ( ) ( ) ( )1 3, 0e H H e H
H
L q e e
e
α θ λ λ ψ∂ = − + =∂ ; 
(3.2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 31 , 0Le L L e L
L L
eL q e e
e e
ψα θ λ ψ λ ∂∂ = − − + =∂ ∂
%
; 




λ λ∂ = − + + =∂ ; 




λ λ∂ = − − + − =∂ ; 
(3.5) ( )31 0cL cc λη
∂ = − + ≤∂  and 0
Lc
c
∂ =∂ ; 
plus the constraints and their complementary slackness conditions. 
 
 
Several general results may be drawn: 
 
- IC(H) is binding: either 0c =  and the second-best contract is chosen, or 0c >  and from 
(3.5) 3 0λ > , so that IC(H) is binding in both cases. 
- IR(L) is binding: from (3.4), one has 2 0λ > , so that there is no rent when i L= . 
- Production is efficient when i H= : from (3.3), one has 1 3q λ λ= + ; replacing in (3.1), 
we find that ( ) ( ),e H H e He eα θ ψ= . 
- There is under-production when i L= : by a similar argument as in Appendix II. 
 
 
The optimal level of ex ante control is determined as follows: 
 
First note that the minimum control cost necessary to deter cheating (possibly in combination 
with rents and productive distortions) is such that ( ) ( ) ( )LL H Hc t e t eη ψ ψ= − − +% . 
 
1. It is not profitable to increase control as long as ( )1/ c c qη >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . 
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Proof: 
From (3.5), 0c =  when ( )3 1/ c cλ η< . From (3.3), we know that 1 3q λ λ= + , so that 3 qλ ≤ . 
Thus, from (3.5) control is optimal only if ( )3 1/ c c qλ η= ≤ . 
 
 
2. The maximal level until which the MoF can increase control is c : ( )1/ c c qη =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . The 
MoF is then indifferent between controlling and not controlling. If the cost of deterring 
cheating by controls alone is too high, the MoF must use a combination of incentives 
(including rents and productive distortions).53 
 
Proof: 
If the MoF opts for imposing controls, from (3.5) we know that ( )*3 1/ c c qλ η⎡ ⎤= =⎣ ⎦ , and 
from (3.3) that 1 0λ = . IR(H) is not binding and there is a rent when i H= . 
Replacing 3λ  in (3.2), we find that the productive distortion when i L=  is equivalent to 
the second-best: the LM is required to produce SBLe . 
As IC(H) is binding, the transfer when i H=  must be equal to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *SBSB LH H Lt e e e cψ ψ ψ η= + − −% . 
We know that ( ) ( )* *
1lim lim
c c c c
c
c q
c cη η→ →= = , so that ( )* *c q cη= . 
The problem is undetermined. The MoF is indifferent between offering the second-best 
contract on the one hand; and, on the other hand, controlling the MoF and receiving the 
following expected output: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * *, 1 ,SBSB SB SBLH H H L L L LE X q e e e e c q e e cα θ ψ ψ ψ η α θ ψ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − + + + − − −⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦%
The agency cost incurred is the second-best. 
 
 
3. If the cost of deterring cheating by controls alone is low enough, the MoF increases 
controls until ( )*1/ c c qη⎡ ⎤ <⎣ ⎦  and leaves no rent to the LM. 
 
Proof: 
From (3.5), ( )*3 1/ c c qλ η⎡ ⎤= <⎣ ⎦ , so that 1 0λ > . IR(H) is binding and there is no rent. 
The MoF deters cheating by increasing control until ( ) ( ) ( )* ACAC LLc e eη ψ ψ= − % , where ACLe  
and 
AC
Le%  are determined by (3.2): 
                                                 
53 This situation can occur when the minimum level of control necessary to deter cheating, 
( ) ( )LLc t eη ψ= − % , is such that ( )1/ c c qη >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . In that case, the MoF must leave a rent to the LM when 
i H= . 
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( )( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( )( ) ( )* *1 1/ / , , 1 1/AC AC AC ACL Lc e e H e L L c e Lq c e e e q c eη ψ α θ α θ η ψ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + = − +⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦% % . 
This problem consists of two equations with two unknowns, *c  and ACLe . 
Using the same argument as in the example of Appendix II, we can show that, under 
reasonable assumptions regarding the form of the production and effort functions, and as 
3 qλ < , the productive distortion associated to this regime is lower than at the second-best: 
* AC SB
L L Le e e> > . 
 
The MoF’s expected output is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * *, 1 , AC ACH H H L L LE X q e e q e e cα θ ψ α θ ψ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 





We illustrate these results using 
1
2 2x eθ= , ( ) 3
3
eeψ = , and ( ) 1 2c cη =  which respect our 
assumptions. 
From (3.2), and replacing ACLe  in ( ) ( ) ( )* ACAC LLc e eη ψ ψ= − % , we find the following equation: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 5/ 65 12 11 125/ 6 12 2 12* *3 2 1 12 1 / 1 1 / 0L H L L Hc q c qθ θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + − − − − =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
As an example, suppose that 0,7 ; 2 ; 4L Hq θ θ= = = . From the equation above, we find that 
* 0,0499625c ≈ , which respects the condition ( )*1/ 0, 447 0,7c c qη ≈ < = . 
Finally, we also find that 0,916ACLe ≈  and 0,000224ACLe ≈% , which respects IC(H). 
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